Deficient
injunction is reviewable
Rule 65(d)
defect does not defeat jurisdiction
By
David Ziemer
david.ziemer@wislawjournal.com
Oct.
11, 2006
|
What
the court held
Case:
Dupuy v. Samuels, No. 06-1027
Issue:
Does a district court’s failure to comply with the requirements
of FRCP 65(d), when issuing an injunction, deprive the court
of appeals of jurisdiction.
Holding:
No. The rule is not jurisdictional; if the injunction is
clear enough to be enforceable, it is reviewable.
|
A
district court’s injunction is subject to appellate review,
even if it violates FRCP 65(d)’s prohibition on the incorporation
of ex-traneous materials.
Ten
years ago, a group of Illinois parents raised challenges to a
variety of practices of the Illi-nois Department of Children and
Family Services. The suit sought class-action status, and claimed
that the Department infringed parental rights guaranteed by the
due process clause. The suit has been working its way through
the courts ever since.
The
subject of this particular appeal is a preliminary injunction
that the Illinois district court issued, enjoining certain practices
by the Department. The parents appealed, arguing that the injunction
did not go far enough, and the Department did not cross-appeal.
In
an opinion by Judge Richard A. Posner, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals not only rejected the parents’ arguments on appeal,
but held that the injunction should not have been issued at all.
However, because the department did not cross-appeal, the court
affirmed, rather than reversing the injunction.
Before
addressing the merits, however, the court engaged in a lengthy
procedural discussion.
The
court found that the injunction violates FRCP 65(d), which provides
in relevant part, “Every order granting an injunction and
every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance;
shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail,
and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act
or acts sought to be restrained.”
In
this case, the district court’s injunction consisted of a
proposal that one of the parties, attached to the injunction itself,
which stated that it approves the proposal, subject to various
listed modifications. As a result, the court of appeals found
Rule 65(d) had been flouted.
Nevertheless,
the court determined that it had jurisdiction to review the injunction.
The
court concluded, “a violation of the rule does not deprive
the appellate court of jurisdiction to review the injunction unless
as a result of the violation it is so unclear what the defendant
is enjoined from doing that he could not be punished for violating
the injunction (cites omitted).”
Where
the materials incorporated into the injunction are adequately
clear, which the court found to be so in this case, the court
concluded that it may review the injunction.
The
court acknowledged that its previous precedent has not been entirely
consistent.
In
Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley
Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992), it held that where
the core of the injunction is clear enough to be enforceable,
it is subject to appellate review.
However,
in D. Patrick, Inc., v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.3d 455 (7th Cir. 1993),
without citing Great American, the court suggested that such an
injunction is unenforceable.
Rejecting
the implication in D. Patrick, the court wrote, “its flat
statement of unenforceability, which is not limited to incorporation
by reference but embraces any injunction that violates Rule 65(d),
is inconsistent with the decisions holding that a violation of
the rule does not affect the jurisdiction of the reviewing court
as long as the obligations that the injunction imposes on the
defendant are clear enough that he can be punished should he violate
them.”
The
court continued, looking at the justification for the statement
in D. Patrick, and found it in a quote from H.K. Porter Co. v.
National Friction Products Corp. 568 F.2d 24, 27 (7th Cir. 1977),
that stated as follows: “Rule 65(d) is no mere extract from
a manual of procedural practice. It is a page from the book of
liberty.” D. Patrick, 8 F.3d at 461.
Rejecting
the justification, the court wrote, “Beware decision by metaphor.
What the court seems to have meant was that it would be unjust
to punish someone for violating an injunction that he could not
understand. It would be. But Rule 65(d) is not needed in order
to ward off that injustice; if the injunction is not clear, the
defendant cannot be punished for violating it.”
The
court added that the language from H.K. Porter is “particularly
inapt” in the case at bar, because it is the plaintiff that
is appealing.
The
court explained, “The difference is that where there is an
injunction and the plaintiff is seeking additional relief, the
need for that relief is likely to depend on what relief the judge
has already granted, and to be able to form a precise and concise
understanding of that relief may require that the rule have been
complied with.”
Turning
to the merits, the court concluded that no injunction should have
been issued at all, based on the current state of the record.
The
plaintiffs alleged that the Depart-ment had abused its authority
by offering parents suspected of abusing their children “safety
plans” — temporary alternatives to immediate removal
of a child for the child’s protection, pending further investigation.
The
court acknowledged that, if the Department were offering safety
plans when it has no suspicion at all of neglect or abuse, the
plaintiffs could show duress.
However,
the court found, “On the record complied so far, the plaintiffs
are entitled to no relief at all.” Because the Department
did not cross-appeal, however, the court affirmed instead of reversing.
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