Seventh
Circuit sentencing split
By
David Ziemer
Wisconsin Law Journal
August
23, 2006
| What
the court held Case:
U.S. v. Hankton, Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915. Issue:
Does the presumption that a guideline sentence is reasonable apply at the district
court level? Holding:
Yes. The presumption is not limited to appellate review of guideline sentences.
|
The
presumption that a guideline sentence is reasonable applies at the time of sentencing,
as well as on appeal, the Seventh Circuit held on Aug. 18.
In
so holding, the court created an intracircuit split of authority, as a different
panel of the court held to the contrary on Aug. 11, in U.S. v. Demaree, 2006 WL
2328665 (7th Cir., Aug. 11, 2006), a case the panel in the case at bar did not
even mention.
In
2002, Clarence Hankton and Gregory Davis each pleaded guilty in federal court
to possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. Hankton was sentenced to
300 months imprisonment, and Davis received 210.
Both
appealed, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed their sentences, concluding that the
district court properly calculated their guideline ranges. U.S. v. Hankton, 432
F.3d 799 (7th Cir.2005). However, the court also issued a limited remand, pursuant
to U.S. v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir.2005).
On
remand, the district judge replied that he would have given Hankton and Davis
the same sentences notwithstanding the now-advisory nature of the guidelines.
The
Seventh Circuit then invited the parties to file arguments concerning the reasonableness
of the sentences, but only Davis and the government responded. The Seventh Circuit
then held both sentences reasonable, in a decision by Judge John L. Coffey.
Pursuant
to U.S. v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2005), a sentence within the guidelines
is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, and the appellate court’s
review is deferential.
“The
presumption that a correctly calculated Guidelines sentence is reasonable not
only applies to the appellate standard of reasonableness review, but also guides
a district judge's consideration of an appropriate sentence.”
Hon.
John L. Coffey
Seventh Circuit |
An
appellant may rebut this presumption of reasonableness by showing that the sentence
is unreasonable when measured against the facts set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a),
such as the “need for the sentence imposed — (A) to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment
for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”
Davis
argued that the district court misunderstood its authority by applying the Mykytiuk
presumption of reasonableness at sentencing, citing a statement by the district
court that Davis failed to “overcome the rebuttable presumption that his
sentence is reasonable.”
Rejecting
Davis’ argument that Mykytiuk only applies on appeal, Judge Coffey wrote,
“the presumption that a correctly calculated Guidelines sentence is reasonable
not only applies to the appellate standard of reasonableness review, but also
guides a district judge’s consideration of an appropriate sentence. It is
only when the defendant provides cogent reasons under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) that a
sentencing judge need consider a non-Guidelines sentence (citing U.S. v. Dean,
414 F.3d. 725, 729-30 (7th Cir. 2005).”
Turning
to whether the sentence was in fact reasonable, the court held it was.
The court
found that the district court thoroughly considered the sec. 3553(a) factors,
and, following U.S. v. Miller, 2006 WL 1541426 (7th Cir., 2006), rejected Davis’
argument that the disparity between sentences for crack and powder cocaine is
grounds for a below-guideline sentence.
The
court rejected Davis’ argument that, because his crimes were the result of
addiction to marijuana and alcohol, and that, at times during his life, he was
a good father and held legitimate employment, the sentence was unreasonable.
The
court reasoned, “evidence of pre-existing drug and alcohol addiction, without
more, is insufficient to render a sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines
range unreasonable. Were this not the case, every convicted criminal who had used
or abused drugs and drink at some time and was not given a reduction under the
Guidelines could challenge his sentence as unreasonable on those grounds alone.”
Accordingly,
the court affirmed.
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here for Case Analysis.
David
Ziemer can be reached by email.
