Officer’s
mistake can’t be probable cause
By
David Ziemer
Wisconsin Law Journal
July
26, 2006
A
police officer’s mistake of law cannot support probable cause to conduct
a stop, the Seventh Circuit held on July 17.
In
2004, two Illinois police officers received an anonymous tip that a black male
driving a maroon Buick possessed drugs and a handgun.
After
seeing a vehicle matching the description, they followed the vehicle. When the
driver, Demarco McDonald, came to a 90 degree curve in the road, he turned on
his turn signal.
The
officers then stopped him for “Improper use of turn signal.” As the
officer approached the vehicle, he noticed a gun on the floor of the car.
McDonald
was arrested and charged in federal court with felon in possession of a firearm.
| What
the court held Case:
U.S. v. McDonald, No. 05-3761. Issue:
If a police officer's stop of a motorist is based on a mistake of law, is there
probable cause, if the officer subjectively thought the motorist committed a traffic
violation? Holding:
No. A police officer's mistake of law cannot support probable cause to conduct
a stop. |
McDonald
moved to suppress the gun. The district court denied the motion, concluding that,
although the anonymous tip was not sufficient grounds for the stop, the stop was
lawful because the officer reasonably believed that McDonald’s use of the
turn signal was a violation of state law.
McDonald
pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, in a decision by Judge Ann Claire Williams.
The
court first concluded that a driver who continues to proceed on the same street
after engaging his turn signal does not violate any Illinois traffic laws.
Having
done so, the court turned to the issue of whether a mistake of law can justify
a stop under the Fourth Amendment.
The
court noted that the majority of circuits to address the issue have concluded
that such a stop is unlawful, and concluded that those courts have correctly analyzed
the issue.
The court
wrote, “An officer cannot have a reasonable belief that a violation of the
law occurred when the acts to which an officer points as supporting probable cause
are not prohibited by law.”
The
court then declined to adopt a good-faith exception to the rule, concluding, “A
stop based on a subjective belief that a law has been broken, when no violation
actually occurred, is not objectively reasonable.”
Quoting
the Ninth Circuit with approval, the court iterated, “To create an exception
here would defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule, for it would remove the
incentive for police to make certain that they properly understand the law that
they are entrusted to enforce and obey.” U.S. v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101,
1106 (9th Cir. 2000).
Finally,
the court distinguished those cases in which an officer stopped a defendant based
on a reasonable belief about a fact that later turned out to be wrong.
The
court concluded “When an officer makes a stop based on a mistake of fact,
we ask only whether the mistake was reasonable. In contrast to the circumstances
in the ‘mistake of fact’ line of cases on which the government relies,
even if McDonald acted exactly as Officer Pearce believed, his actions were not
a violation of any Illinois state traffic law (emphasis in original).”
Accordingly,
the court reversed.
Click
here for Case Analysis.
David
Ziemer can be reached by email.
