Good
Samaritan Case Analysis
May
31, 2006
Although
the decision affirms that of the court of appeals, nevertheless, the two courts’
emphases are different.
The
court of appeals’ decision focused primarily on the passive nature of the
care that the Switlicks provided:
“Suggesting
that a bloody and vomiting woman lie in a bed rather than on a floor, covering
her with a quilt, leaving her alone in a dark room for six or more hours, and
periodically asking if she felt all right does not, we conclude, constitute emergency
care.” Mueller v. McMillian Warner Ins. Co., 2005 WI App 210, 287 Wis.2d
154, 704 N.W.2d 613, 622.
Later,
the court wrote, “Stephani did nothing for Mueller she could not have done
for herself, except waking her up during the night. Without cleaning Mueller’s
wounds, Stephani had no way of knowing what her injuries were. Questioning Mueller
in the dark made it impossible for Stephani to observe any physical changes.
And
waking Mueller every hour or so does not indicate that Stephani treated her as
someone whose state calls for ‘immediate action.’” Id., at 622-623.
Immediately
after this comment, the court of appeals concludes its analysis by stating, “That
nothing was done to make medical help available to Mueller for over six hours
only underscores the fact that Stephani was not responding as if to an emergency.”
Id., at 623.
The
court also stated, “Nothing in the statute suggests any intention that an
ordinary person should make care-giving decisions any longer than the emergency
situation necessitates.” Id., at 621.
Thus,
the court of appeals clearly recognized that whether a defendant sought professional
medical help is relevant; however, the primary focus of the court’s analysis
was the nature of the defendants’ actions.
In
contrast, the focus in the Supreme Court’s decision is squarely on the fact
that the Switlicks did nothing to obtain professional care, with little discussion
of the limited nature of that care, which was so prevalent in the court of appeals’
decision.
In
its initial statement of its holding, the Supreme Court states that “emergency
care” refers to treatment “during the period before care could be transferred
to professional medical personnel.” Par. 6.
Later,
in setting forth its working definition of “emergency care,” the court
limits the definition to care rendered, “Until professional medical attention
is available.” Par. 37.
In
setting forth the legislative purpose, the court found that it was to encourage
care by laymen, “until professional medical care can be obtained.” Par.
40.
Later,
the court uses the expression, “until better health care services are available.”
Par. 42.
And
three times, the court expressly limits immunity to care that is rendered, “before
care can be transferred to professional medical personnel.” Pars. 45, 46,
and 55.
The change in emphasis by the Supreme Court is a positive one.
Under the
court of appeals’ decision, a layperson could provide extensive medical care
that he is unqualified to provide, even though professional help could have been
sought, and would be immune from suit.
However,
a layperson would be denied immunity if he did very little, such as the Switlicks
did in this case, even though there was no feasible way to obtain professional
help.
The
Supreme Court’s decision properly places the primary focus on the availability
of professional care.
Genuine
emergency care should not be immune, if the defendant could easily have summoned
professional care; however, even minimal care such as the Switlicks provided should
be immune, if the facts were different, and it was impossible to obtain professional
care.
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David Ziemer
Click
here for Main Story.
David
Ziemer can be reached by email.
